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Abstract​: What is the utility of US military power when seeking to generate international              
economic arrangements conducive to its national interests? Developing the concepts of           
positive and negative structural power we argue that regional American primacy in East Asia              
has allowed it to leverage its military power into generating political-economic institutional            
outcomes that have reinforced its broader leadership role. The US may well continue its deep               
engagement or follow a path of retrenchment under President Trump. Both grand strategic             
options will impact on its capacity to leverage its positive and negative structural power and               
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In the post-war international system, the United States has followed a remarkably consistent             
grand strategy aimed at maintaining global military primacy whilst broadening and           
entrenching an American-centred international economic institutional order. In practise, this          2
has resulted in active US participation in nearly all areas of the globe with formal               
commitments to assist and protect nations stretching from its NATO responsibilities in            
Europe through clients in the Middle East and toward the US-Japan bilateral alliance in East               
Asia. The Trump administration, with its ambivalence towards long established military           
alliances, has given active voice to what in fact has been a long running foreign policy                
scepticism towards entangling and costly military relationships. The 2008 financial crisis,           3
perceived US strategic failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the rise of state and                
non-state actors such as Putin’s Russia and the so-called Islamic State in the Middle East all                
potentially add to the costs of US action.  4
 
Reflecting these concerns, there is currently a burgeoning debate on America’s strategic            
posture, with most discussions on its grand strategy based on a quantitative conception of              
power as reflective of underlying stocks and flows of resources. Inferring capabilities from             
such quantitative appraisals of state power, particularly GDP and its derivatives, many            
scholars deploy a relational theory of power that measures it in terms of the capacity of actor                 
A to compel actor B to do what they would not freely choose to do. When read through this                   5
lens, in instances where the US fails to get its way on major international issues or key                 
quantitative economic indicators of potential contender states begin to rise, US power is said              
to be in relative decline with a corresponding shift in US grand strategy necessitated by an                
2 Stephen Brooks ​et al​, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment” ​International Security               
37:3 (2012/13) pp, 7-51; See also John Ikenberry, ​Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation               
of the American World Order ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011)  
3 Christopher Layne, ​The Peace of Illusions:  American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca:               
Cornell University Press, 2006)​; More broadly, see William Appleman Williams, ​The Tragedy of American              
Diplomacy (​New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); On offshore balancing more generally see Robert A.                 
Pape and James K. Feldman, ​Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It                   
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); See also Christopher A. Preble, ​The Power Problem: How               
American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free ​(Cornell: Cornell              
University Press, 2009); John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power’, ​Newsweek​,               
November 2008.  
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/28/middle-east-know-the-limits-of-u-s-power.html​;  
4 Paul MacDonald and Joseph Parent, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power              
Retrenchment” International Security 35:4 (2011) p, 19 
5 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) 
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increasingly constrained international system. In some instances, power is disaggregated,          6
such as Nye’s now well-used ‘soft/smart power’ variant. However, even here it still operates              
within a relational conception, albeit with a cultural element that provides forms of             
legitimation that help boost a state’s capacity to attract and compel.   7
  
Whilst these approaches are important parts of the broader understanding of US grand             
strategy, there is now a nascent body of scholarship that draws on alternative structural              
conceptions of power more prevalent in the international political economy literature.           
Moving away from traditional conceptions of a hegemon as benign, these studies seek to              
theorise how hegemons can use positional advantages to maintain preponderance without           
resorting to coercion . Building on these debates, we argue that structural power, whereby              8
states seek to influence others indirectly by changing the international structures and            
institutions in which they operate, may usefully be broken down into two parts: “negative”              
and “positive” structural power. Negative structural power is deployed when a state or states              
seeks to influence others’ behaviours by blocking the operation of existing international            
structures and institutions or blocking others’ attempts to change current structures. Positive            
structural power occurs when a state (or states) attempts to create new international structures              
and institutions or amend existing structures and institutions.  
 
We seek to answer a puzzle: in what ways have America’s global security regimes allowed it                
to produce conducive outcomes in areas unrelated to security? In our formulation, we             
provide specific pathways through which military power can be seen to influence            
non-security matters, and process trace these mechanisms through specific case studies in            
East Asia. We argue that American negative and positive structural power has long been at               
play in East Asia and has formed an important component that has allowed it to ​leverage its                 
security regimes into supporting its international economic preferences. Obviously, major          
6 John Mearsheimer, “Say Goodbye to Taiwan” ​The National Interest​, March-April, 2014.  
 ​http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931 
7 On smart power see Joseph S. Nye, ​The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Joseph S. Nye,                    
The Decline of America’s Soft Power, ​Foreign ​Affairs, Vol. 83. No. 3(2004), pp. 16-20; For an extended                 
critical discussion see Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, editors, ​Soft Power and US Foreign Policy:               
Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives​ (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
8 Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth, ​America Abroad. The United States’ Global Role In The 21st Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Carla Norrlof, ​America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and 
International Cooperation ​(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); See also Doug Stokes,  
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strategic readjustment, for example President Trump terminating major security alliances,          
will likely impact on this leveraging capacity and thus its power to shape the region’s               
political economy.  
 
We begin by reviewing the key theoretical perspectives of those calling for US retrenchment,              
and investigate the manner in which contemporary debates over grand strategy often exclude             
the political-economic externalities of differing strategic postures. Structural power, we          
argue, allows a broader appreciation of the ways in which states get what they want and we                 
use the case study of East Asia to explore some of our theoretical arguments.  
 
US Grand Strategy and Strategic Retrenchment 
The 2008 financial crisis coupled with the US’s 2011 pull-out from Iraq has contributed to               
the perception that US power is in relative decline. A vocal section of prominent IR scholars                9
argue that in today’s world of rising great powers such as China, as well as perennial                
Congressional budget disputes, the US can no longer afford a grand strategy of global              
primacy or deep engagement. Instead the US should scale back its military ambitions and              10
extricate itself from its security guarantees with states in the world’s hot spots. In moving               
from a posture of global primacy, retrenchment has been put forward as a viable alternative.               
This would involve the US pulling back from its global military posture to avoid direct               
9 David Calleo, ​Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009);              
Gideon Rachman, ​Zero-Sum World: Power and Politics After the Crash ​(London: Atlantic Books, 2010; Ian               
Clark, I. ‘China and the United States: A succession of hegemonies’, ​International Affairs. Vol. 87. No 1,                 
pp.13–28​; ​Steven Halper, ​The Beijing Consensus (New York: Basic Books, 2010)​; ​James F. Hoge, Jr. ‘A global                 
power shift in the making: Is the United States ready?’ Foreign Affairs, (​2004) 83(4): 2–7; ​Martin ​Jacques.                 
When China Rules the World (London: Penguin, 2009); ​Gideon Rachman, “American Decline: This Time It’s               
for Real,” Foreign Policy, ​No. 184 (January/February 2011), pp. 59--​-​65; ​Paul Kennedy, ‘​Rise and fall’, ​World                
Today. ​2010​. 66(8/9): 6–9; ​Jeffrey Sachs, J​. ‘America has passed on the baton’, ​Financial Times​, 30 September,                 
2010; Simon Serfaty​, ‘​Moving into a post-western world’​, The Washington Quarterly ​Vol. 43. No. 2 (2011),                
pp.7–23; Fareed Zakaria, ​Post-American World (New York: W.W Norton, 2008​); ​Niall Ferguson, ​Colossus:             
The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004); ​Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere:                
The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East ​(New York: PublicAffairs, 2008); Joseph S. Nye​, The Paradox                  
of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone ​(New York: Oxford University                
Press,2002); Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Rise Is a Sure Thing,” Foreign              
Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 5 (September/October 2011.   
10 Stephen Brooks et al. “Don't’ Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment” International Security               
37:3 (2012/13).,pp7-51. 
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military interventions and instead rely on local allies and regional balances of power to              
prevail with the US only intervening if ​vital ​US national interests are threatened.   11
 
Retrenchment advocates have tended to make a number of arguments. First, drawing upon             
neo-classical realist theory to understand how US primacy developed as the default American             
grand strategy in the post-war system, theorists have identified the importance of unit level              
variables, usually ideational, in the shaping of US grand strategy: ‘structural pressures may             
actually be relatively unimportant in explaining US strategic adjustment’. How then can we             12
relate the US’s default post-war grand strategy of primacy to ideology? US primacy has              
purportedly developed as part of an expansive ‘ideological crusade’ to reproduce the world in              
America’s image. This ‘Open Door’ system meant states and economies around the world             13
were forced open to US influence and ideology, with US security ideationally linked to its               14
capacity to reproduce forms of international stability and order that largely reflected the US              
domestic ideological political preference for free market democracy. That is, ‘the foreign            
policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nation’s               
identity and place in world politics. More than most, America’s foreign policy is the product               
of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to               
justify the United States’ hegemonic role’.  15
 
11 See for example, John J Mearsheimer, ​The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: ​ W. W. Norton &                   
Co, 2002​); Stephen Walt, ​Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy​ (New York: W.W.               
Norton and Sons, 2005); Barry R. Posen, “Restraining Order,” ​The American Interest , Vol. 3, No. 3,                 
(January-February 2008), pp. 94-97; Barry R. Posen, "The Case for Restraint," The American Interest, Vol. 3,                
No. 1, November-December 2007. ​http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331​; Christopher A.       
Preble, ​The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and               
Less Free ​(Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2009); Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, ​Cutting the Fuse:                 
The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010);                 
See also William C. Wohlforth et al, ‘Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History’ ​European Journal of                
International Relations​,  June 2007 vol. 13 no. 2, pp.155-185.  
12 Colin Dueck, ‘Ideas, American Grand Strategy and the War in Iraq’ in Jane Cramer & A Trevor Thrall (eds.)                    
Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (London: Routledge, 2011) p.68. 
13Stephen M. Walt, ‘Offshore balancing: An idea whose time has come’, Foreign Policy, November 2, 2011.                
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/offshore_balancing_an_idea_whose_time_has_come 
14 Layne, ​The Peace of Illusions​; Christopher Layne, ‘America’s Middle East Grand Strategy After Iraq: The                
Moment for Offshore Balancing’, European Journal of International Relations June 2007 vol. 13 no. 2 pp.                
155-185. Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future. Grand Strategy,”,          
International Security​, Vol. 22 No. 1 (summer 1997), p.86–124.  
15 Christopher Layne, “Graceful Decline: The End of Pax Americana,” ​American Conservative, 
Vol. 9, No. 5 (May 2010), p. 33. 
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Given this ideological underpinning it enjoys the luxury of grand strategic choice. That is,              
systemic pressures are not forcing the US to be militarily preponderant, ideological choices             
are and as such it can choose an alternative grand strategy unencumbered by existential              
security threats: ‘two giant oceans and thousands of nuclear weapons today shield the United              
States. Moreover, it faces no serious threats in its own neighborhood, as it remains a regional                
hegemon in the Western Hemisphere [and] the United States faces no great-power rival of              
any real consequence’. Strategically viable US retrenchment would thus extricate it from            16
potential future great power war by avoiding the necessity of maintaining US global military              
credibility in honoring interstate security guarantees (such as the US guarantee with Taiwan             
vis-a-vis China), many of which are deemed to have ‘imposed the greatest burdens --- both               
economically and in terms of dangers --- on the alliance partner (the United States) whose               
security is least at risk.’ If retrenchment is ultimately about significantly downgrading the             17
US’s need to police the world, the termination of defence agreements and form of security               
protection for the US would thus allow it to shift its burdens to states in the regions where                  
these hegemonic rises will most likely occur with the US only stepping in if changes in the                 
balance of power threatens broader US national security interests. As such, the US could              
divert expenditure away from the military and toward other, potentially more profitable,            
activities, such as greater infrastructure and education spending, or through stimulating the            
domestic economy via cuts in taxation.  
 
As important as the up-front costs of primacy are, and as great the perceived financial               
benefits of retrenchment are deemed to be, these debates are often limited by the conceptions               
of power supporting them. Aside from these cost reduction/reallocation arguments, there is a             
limited literature on the potential effects this would have on America’s capacity to shape the               
contours of the global economy. Even sophisticated accounts often reduce calculations to            
‘relative (i.e. dyadic) comparison[s] of monadic attributes such as economic size or shares of              
the world market’ as seen in recent works on US hegemony within the global economy. For                18
16 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘America Unhinged’, ​The National Interest, ​January 2, 2014.            
http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show ; For a detailed examination of the utility         
of US retrenchment see Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success                
of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No.4, 2011.  
17 Layne, ​The Peace of Illusions​, p.169.  
18 ​William Kindred Winecoff. 2015. “Structural Power and the Global Financial Crisis: A Network Analytical 
Approach.” ​Business and Politics​ 17(3), p6. 
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instance, whilst arguing against US decline and the US’s positional advantages within the             
global economy, Norrlof’s work draws upon a structural power based theory but mainly             
evaluates the easily quantifiable attributes of American power. For instance, in relation to             
military primacy, Norrlof argues that positional advantages in security may contribute to            
increased foreign inflows into US markets. Whilst an interesting claim, this focus ignores             19
other pathways through which American positional advantages confer benefits to the           
hegemon. For instance, whilst these flows are easy to analyse and quantify, they do not               
engage with more fundamental interactions between military and economic power which           
may be less statistically accessible, especially in the important area of influencing the             
development of international economic agreements, whether formal or informal.  
 
Similarly, Drezner also confines his analysis to exploring these more empirically accessible            
elements of American military power, evaluating three commonly articulated pathways. The           
first he names ​geoeconomic favoritism, which sees the US attracting greater levels of private              
capital because of its perceived safety as the world’s hegemon. The second is ​geopolitical              
favoritism, which argues that security subordinates may transfer resources to subsidise the            
hegemon. Only then does the third argument deal with more structural elements of military              
primacy. This ‘public goods’ argument suggests that “states are most likely to enjoy public              
goods under a unipolar distribution of power, accelerating global economic growth and            
reducing security tensions” , but stops short of analysing whether the provision of such             20
public goods may actually constitute a form of structural power. Given this, it is therefore               
interesting to note that Drezner then suggests:  
 
A decline in the hegemon’s economic power undercuts many of unipolarity’s posited            
benefits. Both the public goods and geopolitical favoritism arguments have some           
validity, but both rely on the hegmon’s economic might as much as its military might               
for the causal pathways to function.  21
 
19 Carla Norrlof, ​America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation​. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. Chapter 6  
20 Daniel Drezner, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think” ​International Security ​38:1                
(2013) p, 58 
21 Drezner, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay”, 78 
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Intuitive as this may seem, such an analysis suggests that economic and military power are               
both functionally separable and that causation runs from economic might to military might.             
However, economic might itself is built upon specific sets of relationships and agreements             
that are in themselves emergent from specific security structures, and so cannot be so easily               
demarcated from security dynamics. As such, these analyses may miss the manner in which              
American security commitments help contribute to creating and shaping the international           
economic orders on which American prosperity relies.  
 
This implies that researchers analysing economic interactions with military primacy may           
need to compliment their analyses with different sets of methodological tools. In this case,              
not only do we need to broaden the phenomena we intend to observe, but the nature of how                  
specific variables come to interact with one another requires different causal stories. Ideally,             
in conventional understandings of power, we observe the direct and intentional deployment            
of some element of power in order to increase influence. Conversely, structural elements of              
power may not be directly or intentionally deployed, and so often prove more difficult to               
isolate. Conceptually, this had been related to ‘network analysis’, which analyzes the            
relationships between nodes within a network. To borrow an example from William            
Winecoff, “the attractiveness of Goldman Sachs as a counterparty may have something to do              
with its particular skill at investing, but also the fact that Goldman Sachs has strong               
relationships with many other financial actors: it is prominent in the financial system. So              
Goldman Sachs attracts new business in part because it previously has attracted business.”             22
That is, that some nodes in a system benefit merely from their position within a network, not                 
because of specific power attributes alone.  
 
While this form of analysis is not viable to apply to this particular study, the notion of                 
hegemonic positional advantage is nevertheless important. The fact that dominant parties           
within a bilateral or multilateral relationship may be at an advantage by virtue of their               
position alone may negate the need to actively, or formally, coerce or entice another state into                
undertaking a specific action. It is this particular mechanism which we attempt to trace              
22 ​William Kindred Winecoff. “Structural Power and the Global Financial Crisis” p, 8 
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throughout our case studies - do security subordinate states alter their international economic             
behaviour if it threatens to negatively affect security relationships? 
 
Structural power within US grand strategy 
As we have seen, a number of the debates on US grand strategy either explicitly utilise                
relational concepts of power or employ implicit formulations of structural power to guide             
their analyses. Norrlof’s discussion of “positional and structural advantages” is an           23 24
example of this, in which she details how America’s hegemonic stabilisation role generates a              
number of spin-offs for its domestic and international economic relations. We go a step              25
further than this, formulating an explicit structural power conceptualization of the manner by             
which American strategic preponderance aids in shaping non-security relationships,         
particularly international economic. More specifically, we demarcate between two given          
pathways of operation - negative and positive structural power - tracing both methods of              
operation through the subsequent case studies. We argue that in the context of world politics,               
social structures help delimit the capacity to act possessed by states in virtue of the enduring                
relations in which they participate. Social structures thus both constitute the capabilities of             
agents whilst also assigning them the capacity to act through the internal relations of              
structures themselves. Structural power is the capacity to shape structural relations, and in so              
doing help steer the interests and actions (including non-actions) of agents into outcomes that              
reinforce the actual or latent power of the steering party.   26
 
Importantly, structural power does not necessarily require the agent to be conscious or             
deliberative in its attainment, and in this way it is distinct from the concept of foreign policy                 
‘linkage’. Linkage, most popularly associated with US cold war management of the Soviet             
Union, attempts to induce what Kissinger called a ‘network of incentives and penalties to              
23  Michael Mastanduno (2009). System Maker and Privilege Taker. World Politics, 61, pp 121-154. 
doi:10.1017/S0043887109000057.  
24 Norrlof, ​America’s Global Advantage​, 6 
25 Norrlof, ​America’s Global Advantage​, Chapter 6  
26 Jeffrey C. Isaac, 'Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique,' ​Polity​, Vol. 20, No. 1, (Autumn,                   
1987), p. 4-31; See also Simon Bromley, ​American Power and the Prospects for International Order ​(London:                
Polity Press, 2008); Jonathan Joseph, ​“​Is Waltz a Realist?”, ​International Relations​, (2010). Vol. 24. No.4, pp.                
478-493; Jonathan Joseph, ​The Social in the Global ​: ​Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics               
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); see also GUZZINI, Stefano (1993): Structural Power: The             
Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis. International Organization 47, Issue 3 (Summer), 443-478. 
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produce the most favourable outcome’ in order to actively link security and non-security             
issues in diplomatic negotiations. Art explores the manner in which “force influences            27
politics” , exploring the creation of the International Energy Agency and demonstrates a            28
clear application of linkage politics, detailing how “Nixon tied the continued provision of             
American security to the Europeans and Japanese to their acceptance of a united consumers’              
energy front.” Linkage is thus a negotiating tactic that actively and ​intentionally seeks to              29
link issue areas to maximise the chance of achieving the most amenable outcome to the actor                
in question. Differing from this, structural power, 
 
can be effectively exercised by ‘being there', without intending the creation or            
exploitation of privilege or the transfer of costs or risks from oneself to others … In                
relations with others, it is much harder to think of power being exercised by one party                
over another unconsciously, without deliberate intent. But when you think of power in             
terms of power over structures, it is easier to understand that relations existing within              
those structures are affected, even though it may be inadvertently.   30
 
As such, those states that possess the capacity to shape the broader structures within which               
other states interact thus possess both latent and actual structural power: ‘structures allocate             
differential capacities, and typically differential advantages, to different positions’. The          31
power to shape international structures, and therefore the broad systemic contexts that other             
actors or states must work within thus confers a huge amount of ‘command’ capacity and               
necessarily presupposes differential power relations. For example, under bipolarity, the          
superpowers possessed huge reserves of structural capability and could set the broad contexts             
and actions or non-actions of subordinate states within their respective spheres of influence or              
broader hegemony.  
 
27 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.717. 
28 Robert Art, “American foreign policy and the fungibility of force” ​Security Studies ​5:4 (1996) p,8 
29 Robert Art, “American foreign policy”, p,35 
30Susan Strange, ​The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge:                
Cambridge University Press, 1996)​ pp.26-27. 
31 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, ​International Organization ​(2005),             
Vol.59. No. 1, p.53. 
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As we mention above, we would break down structural power into two parts: “negative” and               
“positive” structural power. We define negative structural power as the capacity on the part              
of a hegemonic state to influence others’ behaviours by blocking the operation of existing              
international structures, institutions or attempts by other states to change current structures.            
Positive structural power occurs when a state (or states) attempt to create new international              
structures and institutions or amend existing structures and institutions. Of course, these are             
not fixed categories and it is quite possible that structural power can do both at the same time:                  
the positive creation of new institutions or structures that strengthens hegemonic leadership            
whilst also blocking other states. We are not only interested in the exercise of structural               
power but how what are commonly considered distinct parts of statecraft (economics and             
security) form part of broader basket of capabilities that a state may call upon. In the next                 
section of the paper we show how US structural power in East Asia has waxed and waned,                 
and how it has interacted and emerged from changes in economic power and strategic              
context. Capturing events during and after the Cold War, we explore and control for the               
influence of changes in polarity and relative economic power.  
 
American positive and negative structural power in East Asia 
America’s sustained security presence in East Asia dates back to the end of the Second World                
War, where occupation forces remained in the region in response to the rapidly developing              
Cold War. As a CIA report at the time details, “Japan’s value to the Eastern or Western bloc                  
rests on its industrial potential, its trained manpower, and its strategic location with respect to               
the Asiatic mainland”, in particular it was perceived that “The West would benefit from the               
fact that the industrial and military resources of the nation were retained in friendly hands”.               32
To achieve this, the United States committed military forces to the region, and Japan              
specifically, as a component of a broader quasi-constitutional order in which the economic             
and security interests of Japan would be sufficiently accounted for so as to cement their               
position within a US-centric international order. Japan, in particular, was insistent that            33
American security protection was to be the cornerstone of its economic reconstruction effort.            
32 “Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency - National Intelligence Estimate: Feasibility of Japanese              
Rearmament in Association with the United States” ​Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the                 
Pacific (in two parts) ​Volume 6:1. p, 993 - 995 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1951v06p1  
33 On this see, John Ikenberry, ​After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after                 
Major Wars ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 
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In short, the development of a regional economy amenable to US economic interests              34
entailed the commitment of American military forces to be realised, relying on such             
preponderance to induce cooperation on American terms. The acknowledgement of this           
coaction has influenced the development of economic institutions and norms ever since.            
Specifically, on a number of occasions regional actors have deferred to American preferences             
in the apparent absence of direct coercion. In essence, as explored earlier, this is that power                
“can be effectively exercised by ‘being there', without intending the creation or exploitation             
of privilege.”   35
 
U.S.- Japanese Economic Adjustment in the 1980s 
While America had put up with, if not encouraged, Japanese mercantilism for the few              
decades following the Second World War, when it became apparent that a resurgent, strongly              
competitive Japanese economy was threatening US economic well being it triggered a            
concerted effort by various arms of the U.S. government to rectify the perceived imbalance.              
Starting in the early 1980s the US pushed to open Japanese markets to American products               
and investments, a process which included, rather famously, the ‘voluntary export           36
restraints’ that Japan placed on car exports to the US in 1981. In the mid-80s, during the                 
precipitous strengthening of the US dollar and the concomitant link this had with America's              
sharp current account deterioration, a two-pronged solution was worked out to correct these             
imbalances. Firstly, a number of bilateral negotiations were undertaken in order to open up              
access to Japanese markets, including the Market-Oriented-Sector Selective (MOSS) talks          
and the 1985 Yen-Dollar agreement. And secondly, in response to the perceived slow             
development of these talks, a concerted currency intervention by the G5 powers - Japan,              
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States - was implemented in order to               
attempt to bring down the value of the US dollar, with particular focus on the dollar/yen                
exchange rate.   37
34 Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1961)​ ​p,266-267 
35 Strange, ​The Retreat of the State​, ​pp.26-27 
36 “Memorandum for the President - Japanese Trade Barriers” The United States Trade Representative,              
December 18, 1981. 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB175/japan2-06.pdf  
37 “Announcement of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of France, Germany, Japan, the                
United Kingdom, and the United States (Plaza Accord) September 22, 1985” Finance Ministers’ Meetings,              
University of Toronto G8 Information Centre 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922.htm  
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 Conventional wisdom would suggest that the economic motivations should seem a sufficient            
reason in themselves to resolve this dispute, especially Congressional threats of protectionist            
retaliation. However, a number of details surrounding the case, and now declassified            
documents, point to other confounding factors. In both instances, the entire episode was             
innately tied up within the broader confines of the interlocking political and security             
relationships shared between Japan and the United States. While this may have, as Norrlof              
argues, been in acknowledgement of how “weakening of the [American] economy, the            
fountain of the United States’ military might, would be dangerous for Western Europe and              
East Asia” there also seems to have been a growing concern relating more directly to US                38
security guarantees. For instance, we now know from archival evidence that the American’s             
were aware of the growing security undertones surrounding the dispute.  
 
Indeed, a State Department memorandum dated July 26, 1985 entitled ‘Growing           
Entanglement of US-Japan Trade and Defense Issues’ declares that,  
 
The increasing confluence of trade and defense issues in US-Japan relations           
highlights the inevitable broad impact of chronic trade friction between the world’s            
two largest economies. The US-Japan trade problem, if unchecked, will continue to            
place severe strains on overall bilateral relations and has potential serious           
consequences for Western security.  39
 
The document demonstrates the State department's fear that Congressional (U.S) trade           
retaliation was becoming tied up with defence commitments. Extrapolating from this, it            
seems unlikely that the Japanese would not have had similar inclinations. Infact, while there              
had been defence related tensions before, relevant diplomatic documents do not mention            
anywhere near the level of tension mentioned here. Previous discussions over cost-sharing            
38 Carla Norrlof, ​America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge:            
Cambridge University Press, 2010) p.186. 
39 National Security Archive, “Memorandum: Growing Entanglement of US-Japan Trade and Defense Issues, 
July 26, 1985” Document 7, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 175, The National 
Security Archive.  
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB175/japan2-07.pdf 
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and technology transfer, whilst exhibiting varying degrees of strain, didn’t involve major            
threats of retaliation or fundamental rifts in the bilateral relationship.   40
 
In the early eighties, for instance, Presidential memoranda make no mention of potential             
coercive action nor exceptional levels of aggrievement, rather they are often merely            
reiterations of preference,  
 
“as we protect Japanese interests by our forces in the Indian Ocean, we believe it is in                 
both our interests if Japan assumes a greater share of the burden.”   41
 
However, when tensions rise later in the decade, particularly with respect to the large trade               
deficit, the perception of U.S. policymakers changes dramatically. Not only do they recall             
that the Japanese flirted with the idea to “replace the one-percent [defense spending] ceiling              
to give the executive branch a “weapon” to convince Congress and the American public of               
Japanese good faith.” But these documents also demonstrate their knowledge that the            
Japanese expressed “serious concern that the US will begin soon to step up defense pressure               
in concert with trade demands.”  42
 
As we can see, it is only after the perception that defense commitments were likely to be tied                  
up with calls for economic adjustment that an exceptional attempt to deal with American              
demands is made. This resonates strongly with our aforementioned notion of ‘negative’            
structural power insofar as it was the fear and potential threat of America withdrawing or               
curtailing security guarantees that helped motivate change. As far as it is possible to tell, this                
occurred without ​the explicit coercion of American diplomats, albeit with overhanging fear            
that the United States had this potential leverage to bring to bear. In this case, the result was                  
twofold. Accords signed at the Plaza hotel in 1985 saw the G5 undertake a concerted               
intervention in the international currency markets to bring down the value of the dollar, with               
40 The following document provides an illustrative background to this beginning in the late 1970s: National                
Security Archive, ”Memorandum of Conversation: The 11th SSC, 29 July - 2 August 1979” Document 2,                
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 382, The National Security Archive. 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/370380-19790802a.html  
41 National Security Archive, “Talking Points on Japanese Defense Efforts for Meeting with PM Suzuki, April 
20, 1981” Document 5, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 175 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB175/japan2-05.pdf  
42  National Security Archive,“Memorandum: Growing Entanglement of US-Japan Trade and Defense Issues”  
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the hope that this would then spur a correction in America’s current account balance.              
Simultaneously, the MOSS talks begun the arduous process of attempting to reconfigure            
sectors of  Japan’s economy to remove mercantilist non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  
 
The rather dramatic nature of these actions marked a step change from previous attempts at               
the gradual opening of Japanese markets, pointing to a significant change in calculus on              
behalf of the Japanese. Resulting in an inflection in the dollar/yen exchange rate, but also               
contributing to reconfiguring and liberalising Japan’s domestic economy. This dynamic          
underlines one of the key notions of structural power, that is that it “lies with those in a                  
position to exercise control over (i.e. to threaten or to preserve) people’s security, especially              
from violence.” ​It thus helps to illustrate that America’s dominant position in the regional              43
security system seems to have contributed to delivering a more preferential outcome than             
otherwise may have been the case. In this instance, through leveraging the capacity to block               
the operation of an existing international structure. 
 
Yet this begs the question as to whether this form of security leveraging was confined to the                 
Cold War, with strategic competition acting as the major incentivisation for Japanese            
acquiescence. That is, could the US exercise ‘greater control over international economic            
adjustment struggles during the Cold War, when it was locked in a geopolitical struggle with               
a peer competitor, than after the Cold War, when it has enjoyed the status of sole                
superpower’? If so, this may suggest that changes in systemic polarity and the winding              44
down of geostrategic competition may render this form of structural power ineffectual, or at              
least modify its mode of operation. In the following section we therefore proceed to evaluate               
and trace our logic through a number of cases in the post-Cold War period.  
 
The East Asian Crisis 
An intriguing test bed for our argument occurred rather soon after the end of the Cold War,                 
with a severe regional financial crisis which threatened the potential for radical institutional             
change. The East Asian financial crisis begun in late 1997 following repeated speculative             
43 Susan Strange, ​States and Markets ​2nd Edition (London: Continuum, 1994) p, 26 
44 Mastanduno, Michael, “US power and the international political economy” in John Ikenberry et al eds.                
International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,            
2011) p, 176. 
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attacks on the Thai Baht, eventually forcing the Thai central bank to abandon its currency peg                
and float the currency and thereby dramatically reduce its value and destabilise the domestic              
financial system. In common with the rest of the ‘Asian 5’ - the Philippines, Malaysia, Korea,                
and Indonesia - Thailand had taken on large dollar-denominated debts in the run up to the                
crisis, driven in a large part by the twin effects of capital account liberalisation and the                45
perceived foreign exchange stability provided by their currency pegs. Consequently, after the            
Baht was floated in late 1997, and fearing similar dynamics in neighbouring economies,             
foreign investors refused to roll over short terms loans and moved to pull money out of the                 
rest of the Asian 5. At the time Japan had the largest foreign exposure to these economies,                 
sitting at $97 billion in assets outstanding as of mid-1997, not to mention a broader interest in                 
the recovery of some of its closest trading partners. Moreover, experiences of the Mexican              
bailout a few years earlier had revealed glaring holes in the IMF’s procedural and quantitative               
capacity to resolve economic and financial distress in emerging economies. 
 
The Mexican crisis was eventually, albeit messily, resolved largely because of America’s            
close linkages with the Mexican economy, which prompted the US treasury department to             
move to utilize its Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to top up the IMF’s financial              
firepower. However, due to a large congressional backlash against this action, the ESF was              
subsequently restricted to act only with Congressional approval, in the process stripping the             
US governmental apparatus of vital institutional capacity necessary in responding to future            
international financial instability. Given that this fact was accompanied by the absence of             46
American bilateral loans in the Thai bailout, the Japanese came to doubt that the IMF had the                 
proper capacity to act nor that the was US willing or able to stand in. With Japanese                 47
exposure to the affected economies being as great as it was, the creation of a supplementary                
regional financial institution seemed like a logical step forward, and in many ways a rather               
uncontroversial one.  
 
45 Steven Radlet and Jeffrey Sachs. “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis” in Paul Krugman edt.                  
Currency Crises​ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) p, 113 
46Randall Henning, “Preserve the Exchange Stabilization Fund” Policy Brief, Peterson Institute for International             
Economics, September 1999 
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/print.cfm?ResearchId=95&doc=pub  
47 For a seminal overview of the crisis response see Paul Blustein, ​The Chastening: Inside the Crisis That                  
Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF ​(New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 
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Japan’s suggestion was to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to provide rapid liquidity              
support to the affected economies. In some ways conceptually similar to what in recent years               
the Europeans have constructed to provide liquidity support and economic restructuring to            
Eurozone members. For example, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which has a            
€500 billion lending capacity and is staffed and run exclusively by Europeans. However, the              
AMF proposal differed from this in a number of significant ways, most importantly in that               
“the original policy memo suggested that the AMF would not necessarily act in unison with               
the IMF”. Likewise, the architect of the proposal, Japan’s vice minister of finance for              48
international affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, was known to be openly sceptical of American            
market ideology and vehemently opposed to the IMF’s diagnosis of the crisis as emanating              
from the economic mismanagement of the countries concerned. The ESM, on the other             49
hand, is intended to complement the IMF, not circumvent it. Indeed, the treaty establishing              
the ESM declares that the “active participation of the IMF will be sought” and that “A euro                 
area Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address,             
wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF”. With this being the case, the AMF               50
proposal was considered a threat to the broader global financial system, as well as, more               
obviously, American economic preferences.   51
 
To some extent, the proposal could also be seen to justify Mastanduno’s thesis that the               
dissipation of geostrategic pressures would be likely to diminish America’s capacity to shape             
global economic arrangements. Yet, ultimately, the AMF proposal didn’t take off, and there             52
appears to have been a number of strategic concerns influencing the later objections of              
regional states. However, in this case the manner in which this occurred was substantially              
different from what was witnessed during the 1980s, as in this case Japan was largely               
unaffected by concerns regarding American security presences. In the wording of our own             
conceptual framework, it was not possible to incentivise Japan through denying it access to a               
specific institutional structure - that is, through ‘negative structural power’. Rather it was             
48 Phillip Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3:1 (2003) p,                 
95 
49 Ibid,. 162-166 
50 “Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism” Legal Documents, European Stability Mechanism,            
February 3rd, 2015. 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm 
51Timothy Geithner. ​Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises​ (London: Random House, 2014)​ ​p, 63 
52 Mastanduno “US power and the international political economy”, 176. 
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possible to remind other regional states of the secure security environment that American             
power projection underpins - a positive incentivization. Indeed, it was other regional states -              
particularly China and the smaller ASEAN states - that were responsive to perceived             
concerns of American policymakers, especially the emphasis made of potential ‘Japanese           
hegemony’. In fact, then Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Tim             53
Geithner, recalled that this fear of hegemony resonated well with “Asian countries that still              
viewed the U.S. security presence as an important part of regional stability”. Reflecting the              54
fact “that there is a significant coincidence of preferences between Southeast Asian states and              
the United States for retaining a forward U.S. military presence and U.S. economic and              
political engagement in the region.”  55
 
In this sense, American structural power can be seen to have ‘positive’ instantiations, insofar              
as it can point to the benefits of the status quo and use such pressure to motivate action in                   
defense of current institutional systems. For example, in East Asia the presence of US forces               
is perceived by a number of actors as providing a broadly stable regional security system in                
which the majority of regional actors have a stake. In this way, America’s presence conforms               
to East Asian anti-hegemonic preferences insofar as the projection of extra-regional power            
contributes to pacify conflicts between East Asian states, yet also helps to reinforce the              
values of ‘non-interference’, ‘sovereignty’, and ‘independence’ at the core of the ASEAN            
treaties. With this being the case, whilst changes in polarity are certainly very important, we               56
cannot capture the entire picture of relevant systemic pressures without accounting for these             
regional dynamics. More specifically, Japanese security is not the only objective of US             
military presences in East Asia. Rather stabilising, as far as possible, the ​regional security              
system, particularly as to protect the Western orientated states, has been the historic purpose              
of US military engagement in the region. Indeed, the original US-Japan security pact was              
drafted with the intention to “ensure a reasonable degree of security to Japan and at the same                 
53 Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal” p, 96 
54 Timothy Geithner, ​Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises​ (London: Random House, 2014)​ ​p, 63.  
55 Evelyn Goh, “Great Power and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies”               
International Security ​32:3 (2007/08) p, 152 
56 “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976” Association of Southeast                
Asian Nations.  
http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-
3  
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time give some assurance to Japan’s former enemies that they would not again be threatened               
by an aggressive Japan”.   57
 
American forces were therefore intended to provide reassurance to protect Japan from            
aggression but also to protect others from potential Japanese aggression; a form of dual              
deterrence. A version of this logic was seemingly pivotal to a number of East Asian states                
decisions to withdraw support for the AMF. In particular, as Yuen Foong Khong notes, this               
was heavily influenced by the fears of many smaller East Asian states, specifically those of               
ASEAN, that with the end of the Cold War “the United States would have strong incentives                
to withdraw militarily from East Asia”. As he continues on to argue, many Southeast Asian               58
nations feared that American withdrawal would dramatically destabilise the region,with          
larger states, specifically Japan, moving to fill the power vacuum, likely prompting other             
regional actors into action. Making sure that the United States was firmly committed to the               59
region, and the Japanese were sufficiently constrained, has therefore been a priority since             
(and indeed before) the end of the Cold War.  
 
In this way, the projection of American military power does not only contribute to the               
attainment of favourable outcomes through the direct threatening of consequences or the            
promise of rewards, but also by influencing decisions through structuring the utility of certain              
outcomes. Whilst the Americans lobbied many nations throughout the East Asian crisis, the             
dynamics that led to the rejection of the AMF proposal had developed well before that. In                
short, some of the more salient factors at play did not, in themselves, necessitate the United                
States to attempt to directly influence the states in question. There is little evidence, for               
instance, to suggest that the American’s made any direct threats to curtail defence             
commitments in order to attain specific outcomes. Invalidating any potential notions of            
diplomatic linkage politics. Going forward it is also obvious that these dynamics are             
57 Fredrick Aandahl, editor, ​Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific Volume VI, Part                  
1. United States Department of State (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951) p, 793 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1951v06p1 
58 Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in                
Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy” in J.J. Suh ​et al Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power,                  
and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) p, 177 
59 Ibid,. 182 
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becoming increasingly entrenched in the East Asian political economy, with the region            
having experienced rapid growth in defence spending over the last decade.   60
 
Contemporary Security Leveraging in East Asia 
The most recognisable driver for these increases are the numerous South China Sea territorial              
disputes. In particular, in the Parcel Islands to the North West and the Spratly Islands to the                 
East. The Spratly Islands, for instance, face claims from Taiwan, China, Malaysia, the             
Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei, and have been at the centre of recent controversies             61
surrounding China’s construction of an airstrip on an artificially enhanced islet in the chain.              62
In addition to these larger two island chains, the Philippines has an ongoing dispute with               
China regarding a chain of reefs known as Scarborough Shoal, whereas Japan contests             
sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with China in the East China Sea. These             
disputes have long lineages, displaying the complex mixture of historical and legal claims             
that are typical of such disputes, worsened in this case by the fact that there have been                 
significant mineral deposits discovered in contested regions. Yet despite the seriousness of            
the disputes in themselves, the underlying driver for recent hostility undoubtedly stems from             
the dramatic growth in Chinese power. That is, “political tensions and military competition             
unfolding in the contemporary Asia Pacific appear to be driven largely by action-reaction             
dynamics emblematic of a structurally driven security dilemma.” In this sense, and insofar             63
as regional states remain fearful of China’s intentions and China remains underdeveloped in             
its own structural power capacity, US security leverage will increase according to our             
theoretical model.  
 
60 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2014, Sheet 2 - Regional Totals” Stockholm International Peace              
Research Institute, 2015. 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
61 For an overview of disputants to these claims, the Council on Foreign Relations has an informative interactive                  
guide, which can be found here: 
www.cfr.org/chinasea  
62“China ‘building runway in disputed South China Sea Island’” BBC News, April 17, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32331964  
63 Adam Liff and John Ikenberry, “Racing toward Tragedy?: China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia                
Pacific, and the Security Dilemma” ​International Security ​39:2 (2014) p, 58 
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Specifically, over the last decade, the Chinese defence budget has grown from $40 billion in               
2004 to $216 billion in 2014; a 441% increase. Whilst SIPRI’s estimates sit at the higher                64
end of the spectrum, there is unanimous agreement that official Chinese figures under report              
spending, although due to lack of accounting transparency it is hard to ascertain the exact               
extent. Nonetheless, the speed and size of the increases have been considerable, with             65
wholesale modernisation programmes seeing the quality and capability of Chinese armed           
forces expand significantly. Unsurprisingly this increase in military power combined with           66
nascent competition over these historic territorial claims has unnerved its neighbours,           
prompting many to expand defence budgets as well as renew strategic relationships. Whilst             
much has been made of increases in Japan’s defence budget, with a record￥4.98 trillion              
approved for 2015, it is only marginally above the decade average of ￥4.8 trillion.              67 68
Rather, what seems to have spurred the widespread reporting regarding this increased budget             
request were the type of procurement requests included: stealth fighters, patrol aircraft, new             
naval vessels, and amphibious fighting vehicles. Notably coinciding with the          69
reinterpretation of clause 9 of the constitution to permit ‘collective self-defense’ of allies.  70
 
The forces driving increases in security competition provided the rationale for the Obama             
administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ in 2011, later to be re-branded as the ‘rebalance’. The plan               
involves a greater focus on the Asia Pacific region by engaging regional partners in economic               
and security matters, yet primarily involves a significant shift in the quantitative and             
qualitative forward deployment of US military forces to the region. The 2012 US defence              71
64 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2014, Sheet 6 - Current USD” Stockholm International Peace              
Research Institute, 2015. 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database  
65 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China               
2014” Department of Defense, United States of America, April 24, 2014. p.43 
66 Ibid,. 27-41 
67 “Japan approves record 4.98 trillion yen defence budget” ​BBC News​, January 14, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30808685  
68 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2014, Sheet 3 - Local Currency Financial Years” Stockholm              
International Peace Research Institute, 2015. 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
69 “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan, Overview of FY2015 Budget” Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2015. 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/270414.pdf  
70 “Japan cabinet approves landmark military change” ​BBC News​, July 1, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28086002  
71 U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, ​CNO’s Navigation Plan: 2015-2019​ (Washington, DC, August 20, 2014) 
http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/140818_cno_navigation_plan.pdf  
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strategy document, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21​st Century Defense’​,           
spelled out the broader logic:  
 
US economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc             
extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and              
South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly           
while the US military will continue to contribute to good security globally, we will of               
necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.  72
 
As such, whilst many states in East Asia are economically powerful, and while regional              
forms of interdependence should not be downplayed, many of these states are also             
security-dependent on the US, primarily as a hedge against a rapidly rising China, with the               
US now committed to a build-up of its military capacity in the region. The synergy between                
US strategic and economic interests, as well as the leverage that US mediation capacity              
delivers is made explicit: the ‘maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and               
of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of                
military capability and presence.’   73
 
Indeed, concerns over rising Chinese power have seen a wide range of recent advances in               
security cooperation with the United States. In particular, long established military exercises            
have been significantly expanded. Operation Balikatan, the annual U.S.-Philippines military          
exercise, doubled in size in 2015, expanding from 5,500 up to 11,500. This followed on               74
from the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2014 that has once              
again allowed the stationing of US troops on Philippine soil. These examples of enhanced              
defence cooperation have been repeated across the region with states like Australia and even              
72 US Department of Defense (DoD), ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21​st Century Defense’,               
January 2012, p. 2; For more context see See also Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Co-operation from                   
Strength: US Strategy and the South China Sea’. ​Center for a New American Security. ​January 2012.                
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf​ ; 
73 Department of Defense, ​Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21​st Century Defense (Washington:              
Department of Defense, 2012), p.2.  
74 Matthew Bragg, “31st Iteration of Balikatan Kicks Off” PACOM News, U.S. Pacific Command, April 20,                
2015, ​http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/585545/31st-iteration-of-balikatan-kicks-off.aspx
; Isis Ramirez, “U.S., Philippine Forces Begin Bilateral Balikatan Exercise” DoD News, U.S.             
Department of Defense, May 6, 2014, ​http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122191  
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Singapore permitting the stationing of American military personnel and hardware within their            
sovereign territory , underscoring the manner in which rising Chinese power is coming to             75
reshape the region’s security dynamics. In terms of structural power, this should likely             
provide avenues for the United States to increase its institutional and economic influence. Not              
only does it provide increased, positive incentivization for states to operate within            
US-centered networks, but it is also likely to deepen their reliance on US security guarantees.               
Thus, much like we saw throughout the Cold War, fear of US disengagement may result in                
non-security concessions. Given this, and in keeping with our case selection criteria, can the              
2008 financial crisis and its aftermath tell us anything about how this has affected US               
leveraging capacity? 
 
The Global Financial Crisis and its Aftermath 
Emanating from the global financial system’s core, the financial crisis that begun in 2008 had               
significant effects on the functioning of global financial markets. In addition to Collateralized             
Debt Obligations (CDOs) and similar derivatives infecting foreign banks balance sheets,           
dollar funding markets had also all but seized up. With international finance largely             
conducted in US dollars, this exposed foreign banks to severe liquidity problems as they              76
were unable to refinance their dollar positions, a dilemma worsened by the fact that banks not                
domiciled in the United States lack direct access to Federal Reserve liquidity facilities. In this               
situation, states wishing to avoid financial collapse are normally forced to turn to             
international financial institutions, or bi-lateral agreements with partner states, to attempt to            
secure appropriate funding.  
 
Following the rejection of the AMF, the ASEAN+3 worked to develop alternative financial             
mechanisms to help alleviate financial distress, resulting in the creation of the Chiang Mai              
Initiative (CMI) in 2000. The CMI was essentially an aggregation of bilateral currency swap              
75 “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Republic of Singapore Meeting at Shangri-La” New Release No.453-12, U.S.               
Department of Defense, June 2, 2012. ​http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15337 ; Terri         
Moon Cronk, “Hagel Lauds U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement” DoD News, U.S. Department of Defense,              
August 13, 2014. ​http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122910 ; Tyrone Marshall, “Pentagon’s        
Top Policy Official Praises U.S.-Australia Alliance” DoD News, U.S. Department of Defense, January 21,              
2015. ​http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128005   
76 “Table 5A: Currency breakdown of reporting banks’ international positions – External positions vis-à-vis all               
sectors”, Bank for International Settlements, Locational banking statistics, January 20, 2015. 
https://www.bis.org/statistics/r_qa1503_hanx5a.pdf 
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agreements with hints of multilateralism, although stopping far short of any real pooling             
mechanism. It intended to provide funds to help counteract currency speculation as well as              
provide liquidity support to nations in broader financial distress, albeit in instances of smaller              
disruptions, with the total financial resources of the CMI sitting at only $80 billion before the                
crisis struck in 2008. Whilst East Asia was not widely exposed to disruptions in the US                77
housing market, economies with internationalised financial systems were susceptible to dollar           
funding shortages, marking Japan, South Korea, and Singapore out as potential risks.            
However, despite the severity of the crisis, the CMI was left untapped. Rather, instead, these               
states turned once again to the United States for liquidity support. In this case, the US federal                 
reserve established a wide range of dollar swap lines with other central banks which offered               
unlimited ​dollar liquidity throughout the crisis, also providing foreign bank subsidiaries           78
domiciled in the United States unlimited access to its discount window. Federal reserve data              
shows that of the $3.3 trillion of extra liquidity supplied to the US domestic economy               
throughout the crisis, over half went to foreign banks. Because of this, the CMI was neither                79
needed nor had the capacity to provide sufficient resources to any of the states in question                
even if required.  
 
In this sense, the crisis was resolved without substantial revisions to the institutional             
architecture of the global economy, foregoing the need for broader hegemonic tools to be              
brought to bear to help shape potential readjustment struggles. More revealing were the             
regional dynamics leading up to and after the crisis, particularly the forms of institutional              
development witnessed post-2008. The three most important developments, in terms of size            
and progress, are the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), the Trans-Pacific           
Partnership (TPP), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). All three exhibit            
features in keeping with East Asian fears of the ‘hegemony’ of large regional states, a               
preference for regional inter-governmental networks that keep power vested in the nation            
77 “The Joint Ministerial Statement of the 10th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting (5 May 2007, Kyoto)”                
Ministry of Fiance Japan. 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/asean_plus_3/20070505.htm  
78 “Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines” Regulatory Reform, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve               
System, January 12, 2010. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_swaplines.htm  
79 Broz, Lawrence. “The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-2010” Paper presented at the                 
International Political Economy Society (IPES), University of Virginia, November 9-10, 2012. 
http://ucrpoliticaleconomy.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Broz_Fed.pdf 
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states rather than supranational bodies, and a broader effort to tie the United States deeper               
into the region’s security order.  
 
The CMIM, established in 2009, updates the aforementioned CMI to be “a single contractual              
agreement for the purpose of providing financial support in United States Dollars through             
currency swap transactions.” ​It offers precautionary and crisis resolution facilities, with           80
programmes disbursing over 30% of any given quota linked to an IMF programme. At              81
present, total resources stand at $240 billion, although swap amounts are adjusted for size,              
with Japan and China only allowed to call on half of their financial contribution. This                82
peculiar situation, compounded by a liberal use of the word multilateral (the disbursement             
process is still bilateral), is very revealing. Not only is the institution enmeshed in broader               83
global governance networks, but its largest states are only entitled to draw on half of their                
quota, using their financial resources to subsidise smaller states in the arrangement.  
 
Recently, however, a more interesting institutional development has occurred in the region in             
the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). From the details that have been               
released, the proposed investment bank is open to membership from around the globe, and              
will seek to fill infrastructure funding gaps that have been repeatedly identified over the last               
decade, aiming to establish a $100 billion pool of capital to help achieve this goal. Indeed,                84
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has published numerous reports over the last few years,              
outlining the need for about $800 billion of annual investment in infrastructure in the              
Asia-Pacific region from 2010 through 2020, as well as identifying significant deficiencies            85
80 “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization” Banco Sentral ng Philipinas, March, 2015. 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/publications/faqs/cmim.pdf 
81 Ibid,. 
82 “The Joint Statement of the 15​th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ - Meeting 3 May                  
2012, Manila, the Philippines” May 3, 2012. 
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/convention/asean_plus_3/20120503.pdf  
83 “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization” Banco Sentral ng Philipinas, March, 2015. 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/publications/faqs/cmim.pdf 
84 “Frequently Asked Questions” The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)  
http://www.aiibank.org/html/pagefaq/Faq-Preface.html  
85 Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, “Estimating Demand for Infrastructure in Energy, Transport,           
Telecommunications, Water and Sanitation in Asia and the Pacific: 2010-2020” ADBI Working Paper Series              
No. 248, Asian Development Bank Institute, September 2010.  
http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.08.09.wp248.infrastructure.demand.asia.pacific.pdf  
25 | ​Page 
 
in the capacity of regional states to raise the required capital to finance such projects. Whilst                86
in itself the AIIB is no major threat to the existent institutional order in East Asia, it is                  
nevertheless indicative of broader Chinese ambition. For instance, the share allocation           
dictates that China will contribute 30% of the capital and hold roughly the same percentage in                
voting power. Given that many votes have a ‘three-fourths’ rule this implies effective veto              
power. At the same time, while it is also obvious that the AIIB is largely the result of                  87
China’s ambitions to play a broader role in global economic affairs, the level of ‘threat’ is not                 
synonymous with that which may have been afforded by the AMF. The AIIB gives regional               
states ​more options, whereas the AMF was likely to take them away. This also reflects the                
fact that both regional organisations (such as ADB) and global institutions (like the World              
Bank) have been slow to makes changes in voting power consummate with East Asia’s              
economic growth, with China’s voting rights remaining only a fraction higher than Canada’s             
at the ADB.   88
 
As Injoo Sohn observes, the AIIB could therefore be described as a ‘hedging’ strategy which               
seeks to “explore both global and regional options lest it limit the range of strategic options                
available...creating non-confrontational means ways [sic] to resist the pressure of the status            
quo powers”. Seen in this light, these institutions are not overt attempts to recast the               89
regional order, rather they appear to serve a somewhat ​anti​-hegemonic role, a characteristic             
that seems to define East Asian regionalism more generally. At the same time however it was                
also obvious that American interests were nonetheless sidelined. Their many attempts at            
dissuading allies fell on deaf ears, and (as we state above) were generally seen as misguided.               
Nonetheless, it provides an interesting examination of structural power dynamics insofar as             90
it alludes to some specific limitations to leveraging military force for influencing            
86 “Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia: interim report” (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute,              
2013) 
http://www.adbi.org/files/2013.05.05.book.connecting.south.asia.southeast.asia.interim.report.pdf  
87 “Articles of Agreement” Asian Infrastructure Bank, June 29, 2015.  
http://www.aiibank.org/uploadfile/2015/0629/20150629094900288.pdf  
88 “Members, Capital Stock, and Voting Power (as of 31 December 2014)” Annual Report 2014, Asian                
Development Bank. 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/158032/oi-appendix1.pdf  
89 Injoo Sohn, “AIIB: A plank in China’s hedging strategy” Brookings East Asia Commentary, Brookings, May                
2015. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/05/11-china-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-sohn  
90 FT View, “America’s flawed strategy  towards AIIB” ​The Financial Times​, May 20, 2015.  
https://www.ft.com/content/eef600b8-fee0-11e4-84b2-00144feabdc0  
26 | ​Page 
 
international economic agreements. In this case, that the United States was not capable (nor              
likely willing) to use forms of negative structural power to constrain allied actions. Equally,              
they were also unable to point to the benefits of status quo to motivate them insofar as most                  
actors actually saw the AIIB as ​reinforcing the current international economic system. More             
pointedly, this illustrates the more subtle aspects associated with American structural power.            
Primarily, that as long as US forces remain committed to the region, and so prevent attempts                
at ​regional hegemony, it is very difficult for any given state to launch institutions that               
fundamentally undermine the pre-existing economic and security order in the first place.  
 
Linked to this, recent increases in security competition between East Asian states we have              
seen an increased drive to tie the United States into the economic order as a part of its wider                   
security engagement in the region. For instance, much of the rhetoric surrounding the TPP              
reflected as much of a strategic rationale as it did an economic one. Japanese Prime Minister,                
Shinzo Abe, specifically emphasised this connection when he delivered what was to be the              
first address by a Japanese Prime Minister to a joint meeting of Congress in April of 2015. In                  
particular, he noted that Japanese entry into Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations           
“goes far beyond just economic benefits. It is also about our security. Long-term, its strategic               
value is awesome. We should never forget that.” The US turn to Asia thus provides stability                91
for the global economy, and as Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State argued, the               
Asian and European economies are the “linchpins of the global economy and international             
relations” in an “economically interdependent” world dependent on American power          
projection capacity as the “strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global               
effort to secure and sustain America's global leadership.” Such processes would indicate            92
that a deepening of East Asia’s security fractures may work to accommodate American             
ambitions for continued regional leadership - that is, offering positive incentives for            
engagement with American economic and security arrangements. Now, whilst President          
Trump has decided to upend TPP, this underlying security dynamic nonetheless provides            
leverage if he is willing to use it. In fact, one could speculate that this is exactly the dynamic                   
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that he is intending to manipulate in order to push through more ‘American friendly’ bilateral               
deals with regional states.  
 
Because the favourable development of the global economy, including resolution in systemic            
disequilibrium, have relied heavily on the projection of US economic ​and military power             
America’s security presence affords it influence to create and enforce favourable economic            
conditions for the growth of the US economy. Because of this, developments in the region’s               
economic architecture are intimately related with its security system, implying that a            
drawdown in America’s security presence may have unpredictable effects for its institutional            
influence. Despite this, and regardless of force posture alterations under President Trump, it             
is nonetheless clear that American power projection is intimately related to the ordering of              
non-security issues. With its security guarantees and defensive posture in the East Asian             




The extent to which one views contemporary grand strategies as unaffordable or undesirable             
is inherently linked to the manner in which we conceive that competing strategies are deemed               
to confer benefits in relation to both physical security and economic prosperity. In this way,               
whilst the quantitative indicators supporting this conception of power are important for            
understanding many aspects of international relations, there are limitations to their           
explanatory power that impact on our ability to understand and interpret the utility of certain               
grand strategies. For instance, our analysis of U.S.-Japanese economic diplomacy in the            
1980s, particularly in the earlier part of the decade, illustrates that even when the United               
States has been considered to have been in significant relative decline its latent structural              
power enabled it to successfully negotiate economic adjustment struggles. More recently, we            
can also see that whilst the rapid growth in the size of many East Asian economies has begun                  
to shrink the relative gap in economic power between the United States and East Asia,               
aspects of its structural power are actually becoming reinforced by strategic developments in             
the region. Indeed, as we have noted, the negotiation of the now defunct TPP owes much to                 
such rationales.  
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 Because of this, if we broaden our theoretical understanding of power relations to take              
account of structural power dynamics, and so America’s capacity to leverage security            
preponderance in one area to help produce conducive outcomes in others, different            
evaluations of the utility of military power and subsequent viable grand strategies emerge. In              
particular, our demarcation between positive and negative structural power permits the           
process tracing of structural power through different cases and scenarios, shedding light upon             
the interactions between military force and non-security issue areas. While our study has been              
limited to the East Asian case study, this conception of power - and its theoretical and                
empirical application to other regions of the globe - would therefore allow a fuller and more                
robust assessment of the often close interrelationship between international security and           
political economy. Schools of analysis that need a closer dialogue in the aftermath of the               
financial crisis of 2008, particularly the potential implications of US relative economic            
decline for the continued viability of the liberal international order. We have attempted to              
broaden theoretical understandings of power and how these may, often unconsciously, impact            
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